Austin Bar Member Thomas R. Phillips, Baker Botts, for Petitioners
Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake
Negligence – Causation
This car-crash case involves arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, charge error, and damages.
The December 2014 crash occurred on I-20 in Odessa, while a Winter Storm Warning issued by the National Weather Service was in effect. The warning cautioned that driving conditions would be extremely hazardous due to freezing rain and icy roads. Shiraz Ali, a novice driver employed by Werner Enterprises, was driving an 18-wheeler on I-20 westbound. He was accompanied by his supervisor, who was sleeping. In the eastbound lanes, Trey Salinas drove Jennifer Blake and her three children. Salinas hit black ice, lost control of his vehicle, and spun across the 42-foot-wide grassy median into Ali’s westbound lane. Ali promptly braked, but the vehicles collided, resulting in the death of one child and serious injuries to the rest of the Blakes.
The Blakes sued Ali and Werner for wrongful death and personal injuries. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict, which found Ali and Werner liable and awarded the Blakes more than $100 million in damages. Sitting en banc, the court of appeals affirmed over two dissents.
Ali and Werner filed a petition for review. They argue that Ali did not owe a duty to reasonably foresee that the Blakes’ vehicle would cross the median into his path; that no evidence supports a finding that Ali’s conduct proximately caused the crash; that Werner cannot be held liable for derivative theories of negligent hiring, training, and supervision when it accepted vicarious liability for Ali’s conduct; that the court of appeals erred by rejecting petitioners’ claims of charge error on grounds of waiver; and that the jury’s comparative-responsibility findings are not supported by legally sufficient evidence.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Case documents can be viewed at search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=23-0493&coa=cossup
The recording of this argument can be found on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=MnEzrMBMdQY
Austin Bar Member Wallace B. Jefferson, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson, for Petitioner
BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik
Jurisdiction – Personal Jurisdiction
The issue in this case is whether the trial court had specific jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer for claims based on an allegedly defective product.
Sheema Shaik suffered serious injuries when a plane she was flying crashed at an airport in Texas. She and her husband sued BRP-Rotax, the plane’s engine manufacturer, asserting claims for strict products liability, negligence, and gross negligence. Rotax is based in Austria and sells its engines to international distributors who then sell the engines worldwide. The engine in this case was sold by Rotax under a distribution agreement to a distributor in the Bahamas whose designated territory included the United States.
The trial court denied Rotax’s special appearance contesting personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed. Applying the stream-of-commerce-plus test, the court held that Rotax purposefully availed itself of the Texas market and that Shaik’s claims arose from or related to those contacts with Texas.
Rotax petitioned this Court for review. It argues that all relevant contacts with Texas were initiated by Rotax’s distributor, which Rotax had no control over or ownership interest in. In response, Shaik argues that Rotax’s distribution agreement indicated an intent to serve the U.S. market, including Texas, and that Rotax maintained a website that allowed Texas customers to register their engines and identified a Texas-based repair center.
The Court granted the petition for review.
Case documents can be viewed at search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=23-0756&coa=cossup
The recording of this argument can be found on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=IVDs-Jym8n0
Austin Bar Member Jane Webre, Scott Douglass & McConnico, for Appellee
Perez v. City of San Antonio
Constitutional Law – Religion Clauses
This certified question concerns Article I, Section 6-a of the Texas Constitution, which prohibits the state of Texas and its political subdivisions from prohibiting or limiting religious services.
The City of San Antonio’s plans to improve Brackenridge Park require the City to temporarily close the Lambert Beach area of the park. Plaintiffs Gary Perez and Matilde Torres—who are members of the Native American Church and consider the Lambert Beach area a sacred place—sued the City, alleging that the City’s planned changes to and temporary closure of Lambert Beach violate Section 6-a. The district court denied plaintiffs’ request for access to the Lambert Beach area for individual worship and their request to minimize tree removal.
The Fifth Circuit seeks guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the scope of Section 6-a. The City argues that the changes aim to promote safety and public health, while plaintiffs contend that Section 6-a does not even allow the City to try to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Texas Supreme Court: Does the “Religious Service Protections” provision of the
Constitution of the State of Texas—as expressed in Article 1, Section 6-a—impose a categorical bar on any limitation of any religious service, regardless of the sort of limitation and the government’s interest in that limitation?
The Court accepted the certified question.
Case documents can be viewed at search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=24-0714&coa=cossup
The recording of this argument can be found on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=zUiYQdX_Bp8
Austin Bar Member Amy Warr, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson, for Appellee
Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc.
Constitutional Law – Administrative Subpoenas
This direct appeal case concerns a constitutional challenge to the Attorney General’s administrative subpoena powers. Pursuant to its authority to examine books and records of businesses registered in Texas, the Attorney General served an administrative subpoena on Annunciation House, a Catholic volunteer organization, seeking a variety of documents pertaining to individuals who received certain services from Annunciation House.
Annunciation House sought a declaratory judgment against the Attorney General, challenging the administrative subpoena on constitutional grounds, and later filed a no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment. The Attorney General cross-filed an application for temporary injunction, leave to file a quo warranto counterclaim, and a plea to the jurisdiction, which, among other things, sought to revoke Annunciation House’s business registration.
The trial court granted Annunciation House’s summary judgment motion, concluding that the administrative subpoena statute was facially unconstitutional and entered injunctive relief against the Attorney General as to future administrative subpoenas served on Annunciation House. In a separate order, the trial court also denied the State’s application for temporary injunction and leave to file an amended petition asserting the quo warranto counterclaim, concluding that two provisions of the Texas penal code that served as the basis for the quo warranto counterclaim were preempted by federal law and that the penal code provisions and the quo warranto statute were unconstitutionally vague in violation of due course of law and therefore unenforceable.
The Attorney General filed a direct appeal with the Court. Oral argument was granted on notation of probable jurisdiction.
Case documents can be viewed at search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=24-0573&coa=cossup
The recording of this argument can be found on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=qKOfafKjx_0
Austin Bar Member Cory A. Scanlon, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, for Respondent
In re Carlson
Administrative Law – Administrative Procedure Act
At issue in this case is whether the state Comptroller is required to issue a final order after the State Office of Administrative Hearings dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction.
Thomas and Becky Carlson filed an administrative contested case against the Comptroller, alleging a takings claim. The Comptroller then referred the case to SOAH to conduct a contested case hearing. The Comptroller filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the administrative law judge granted. A SOAH official advised the Carlsons that the Comptroller needed to issue a final order before any further action could be taken in the case. The Carlsons requested that the Comptroller accept, reject, or modify the SOAH dismissal so that they could file a motion for rehearing, a prerequisite to seeking judicial review. The Comptroller refused, asserting that the SOAH dismissal was already a final, appealable order. By then, the deadline to file a motion for rehearing had passed.
The Carlsons sought mandamus relief in the trial court but nonsuited that action after the Comptroller filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The Carlsons then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, arguing that the Comptroller had a ministerial duty to issue a final order in their case under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court granted argument on the petition for writ of mandamus.
Case documents can be viewed at search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=24-0081&coa=cossup